Care as a Legal Concept

By Stephen Downes
Nov 23, 2021
Transcript of Care as a Legal Concept

Unedited audio transcript from Google Recorder

Hi, everyone. Welcome to ethics analytics and the duty of care going Steven Downs, and we're in module, six titled, the duty of care. And this is the second video this week. It's called care as a legal concept. And in it we're going to explore the idea more or less of care and the duty of care specifically as it's developed through time, to become a legal concept and then more recently as it has been deconstructed as a legal concept.

Now, I want to say at the outset of this particular video, I am not a lawyer on. This should not be taken to constitute any sort of legal advice, or legal opinion, or even be thought of as accurate legally. I shouldn't have to say that and to me, it says something about the whole legal profession that I do.

But there you have it. So let's go back to the beginning and the beginning, when we're thinking of the concept of the duty of care is, Well the idea that there's a responsibility or legal obligation of a person to avoid acts or emissions that could likely cause harm to others.

And here on quoting from the CPHA website here. And This appeals to what, we might call, a standard of care and taking over the terminology because we'll come back to that, which is only relevant when a duty of care has been established and it speaks to again, according to the same website about what's reasonable in the circumstances.

So if there's no duty of care, there's no need to standard of care, which seems very odd. But there you have it. And then as with many other cases, in-law, what counts here is as defined by the reasonable person. In other words, a person who is thought to be careful and considerate in their actions, not unusually.

So and not unusually careless, just summer writing a little common ordinary. Reasonable citizen. Who's in a profession? Who has a duty of care who has an obligation, therefore to avoid acts or emissions, that might cause harm to others, okay? Makes sense. So this as we mentioned in the previous video, goes back to the case of the snail in the bottle and the snail, in the bottle case was heard by Lord, Atkin and the dictum here is that people must take reasonable care, not to injure others who could be foreseeably affected by their action, or in action and more in general, every man ought to take reasonable care.

That he does not injure his neighbor. And again, I'm quoting from these websites for give the lack of quotation marks on the slide. I'm not coming up with these words on my own, but we get the sense here, right? We get the sense of foreseeability, we get the sense of the requirement not to injure and and, you know, this could be construed reasonably widely because there are various ways of injuring a person and so they ought to take reasonable care not to injure their neighbor.

Who in this case, was the person who purchased a bottle of ginger beer, I looked it up and on the second pouring found a decomposed snail which did violate a duty of care because you know, college harm as any decomposing snail and I need ginger beer, wood, and a reasonable person.

Could expect that fair enough. So what's interesting about that principle is that it brings in the concept of neighbors and enacting says the rule that you are to love your neighbor becomes in law. You must not injure your neighbor. Now this is interesting to me because he's actually bringing in a rule from what biblical law.

Specifically the injunction to love your neighbor and it makes me think of some of the discussion of care that we will encounter later on where we're actually is something like requirement that teachers love their students. Personally, as a requirement that, I think that might be asking to much, but you can see the origin here.

And you can see how we'll pull back perhaps from that, all encompassing injunction to something more basic that we can work with, don't hurt them, don't harm them, don't injure them. The other question that comes up with this definition is who is your neighbor because an action? I take my conceivably, injure.

Somebody in Ethiopia, although I have no way of knowing this really and so there needs to be some limits drawn. Presumably about the range of my responsibility to avoid hurting others and so we read questions of proximity and deliberation as to the fairness, justice and reasonableness of the imposition of a duty of care, should be considered.

And this comes to me known as the neighbor principle. So okay, so we have a limited scope of, you know, duty and a limited range of duty and so that's what is becoming more entrenched in law as opposed to ethics. Although there is this basis in ethics, right? The basis is the principle that you should love your neighbor.

Well also, what we find is the duty of care becomes more specific and more, shall we say urgent? What a special relationship exists. So here for example, and again quoting from a lot teacher.net which will work in this case. If it can be shown that a special relationship subsisted between the parties.

For example where this plane at the party, seeking the information or advice was trusting the other two exercise such a degree of care as a certain stance is required than a duty of care exists. And indeed that duty of care exists, according to this account, only if this special relationship exists.

So how we're narrowing it now a little bit, there's a wider range in tort law of, you know, don't go around hurting people, but the duty of care, now is specifically defined to hold in these cases where a special relationship exists and by the same token and on the flip side, it also recognizes the need to protect professionals when they're in these positions where, you know, they're particularly susceptible to negligence claims.

So, like a doctor, for example, might do something that involves some risk, a lawyer, by the very nature of the practice, always risks not winning the case and it might be due to them. It might not be true to them. Might be the facts might be the mood of the judge.

You know, they they can't be held accountable in all of these cases and unless they did not exercise the duty of care, whatever that means, right? But you see how we're bounding the sense? Now into something that ought to maybe be encoded in a professional code of ethics or something like that?

It still has its basis in a moral principle. But now it really is becoming an expression of a limit or a lying that you can't cross. If you're going to work as a professional by contrast, there's a range of laws known as good Samaritan laws. And and these are interesting for the most part, our law does not require that you provide assistance to people of one sort for another.

Now, there are exceptions in Vermont saying or come back or on this final episodes of Seinfeld where the Seinfeld gang. Are famously throwning to jail. For just sitting there laughing at an assault victim but mostly, you know, there is no requirement but we would expect it, you know, ethically.

It would be good if you helped somebody who was in trouble. If you risk drowning to to rescue a person who's struggling in the water or you know, or if you saw somebody choking, if you took urgent, means to help them not be choking anymore. And of course, taking these actions does involve risk.

You might not be an expert, but there are situations where if a media action isn't taken the the outcome of harm to the person is searching. So, you know, there's a little more attitude here. I mean, the idea here is to protect bystanders who render aid even if they weren't very good at it.

You know, so long as they're not being grossly negligent and where, what this does not protect our professionals, where a duty of care exists. So, you see, again, this cleavage between ordinary instances of helping people and helping people as a profession. And when we're helping people as a professional, then we're bound by the standards of the duty of care which is to say to act as a reasonable person would act.

Excuse me. Don't know if coughing violated by duty of care to your ears, but I did it anyways. So here I'm getting this from the IET website, which offers work on professional ethics. And I put this in here just because of the way it's phrased, as well as the the list of items that it covers.

And the way it puts it, ethics has the same purpose here as other standards, namely to standardize the professions work to protect the public to promote, similar development to begin with common sense to be modified based on the experience of the profession. Etc to define each profession by a certain sort of judgment where these judgments are taking in certain sorts of contexts.

So the profession defines a specific ethical context within that context. Ethics becomes a standard and we want to be careful about how we're using the words standard here. It's, it's not like a standard as well, you know, you have to get 80% or better. That's the standard. It's more like a standard that's the sort of thing that develops from a specification or a protocol.

You know. This is the way of doing things, this is the way we see things. This is how we approach problems. This is what care looks like in the context of this profession. And that's how we end up with these ethical codes. So we discussed in the previous module, so it's taking something that began as the admonition to not injure your neighbor and it's refining it and codifying it as a standard that is part of the overall definition of a profession, okay?

It's still in ethical concepts though and we still see justifications for this standard EMFX. I've got a couple of examples here, one, for example, where duty comes from the and I'm quoting the day, ontology, ethical theory, and this sees duty as the basis of morality and holds that some acts are obligatory.

So we've looked at day, ontology already in the previous module and we know that it's a bit broader than that, but not in the last, we can get the sense of where a duty of care. Say in law would be derived from a system of moral obligations or on the other hand we read in Wikipedia duty of care, maybe considered a formalization of the social contract, the implicit responsibilities held by individuals towards others within society.

Now again, that's not I'm especially deep representation of what we mean by social contract. And again, we've already seen more detailed accounts, but you could see how you could be gained to represent duties within a profession as obligations under the framework or structure of a contract. Pretty much as though they are a contract.

And so we've got this ethical concept, that is now a contractual concept, whether it's with society as a whole, or whether it's with specific clients, always in a specific context and always, according to some sort of standard or framework. Similarly, in business, we also have a principle of duty of care Here.

I'm quoting from investopedia and just isn't a sign on my sources, the, I know. Okay, but it doesn't matter. I'm not quoting these sources as authorities. I'm quoting these sources because they made the point in a nice succinct easy to access fashion. This isn't intended to be. Well, I'm not sure what, it's not entertained to be, but what it is intended to be, is a way of getting at these concepts, in a way that makes sense.

And I'll leave the quibbling about whether duty of care and businesses is exactly this or not. I'll leave back to the scholars in the lawyers for our purpose, if we get it pretty close to, right? That'll be good enough. That's my interpretation of the duty of care in this course.

So here in investopedia, we read duty of care refers to a fiduciary responsibility held by company directors, which requires them to live up to a certain standard of care. That is just a care of the company, this duty, which is both ethical, and legal requires them. To make decisions in good faith.

And in a reasonably prudent manner. Now, we could extend this and probably should extend this to me. Make decisions in good faith. And in a reasonably prudent manner, with respect to their customers. But it's important to understand here, that that's not really where the loyalty lies. And the only reason you're expressing a duty of care to your customers is because it's part of your duty of care to the company I think and that's my interpretation of this.

And again, I am not a lawyer, but I think it's I think it's a defenseable interpretation. In this context, we can actually think of different levels of duty of care. So there's intentional injury. So the the duty of care of course is to not do this, I mean the case of intentional injury the injured person has a right to recover damages, not surprisingly the duty of care.

Also, argues against being negligent, that is to say engaging in acts. That create a foreseeable risk of injury to others. How I could go off on a tangent about what we mean by foreseeable risk. But I'm not going to go off on that tangent. I don't think it's that relevant here, but if, if we don't know, we'll just say the word reasonable person and and cover our basis.

That way recklessness also violates a duty of care and that is to say acting with utter disregard for the safety of others. And then finally strict liability, which involves cases involving manufacturing defects and products. If you make something and it's defective and it hurts someone, then you're liable. And so a duty of care would caution you to take the necessary steps to avoid manufacturing, things that injure others.

So what we have now is this idea and we've looked at it in law, we've looked at it in business and we have looked at it and in medicine where the role that it into individual assumes, in society has a corresponding moral value, or moral obligations, that can be go beyond, or differ, from what we see is ordinary morality.

Now in this account by Judith Andre, we can see that these roles. I mean there are there's more than one role any person has more than one role. I simultaneously at this exact moment have the role of teacher of the role of research here. The role of husband to my wife, the role of uncle, the role of, okay, irresponsible child, who hasn't done things for his parents in a little while.

Some of these are voluntaries such as engineer physician that you decide that you're going to take, some of them are involuntary such as being, a grandmother that just happens to you. And as Andre says, we can hold many roles simultaneously in society. And these roles are constantly shifting, and being negotiated by society of my ourselves.

And importantly roles are not always contracts, nor are they simply means protecting others. This is an important move here. This is from 1991 but it's a move that us you'll see began to take place drawing number of decades earlier, we're moving away from this idea that even though there are roles removing away from this idea that roles are standard.

That roles are a contract between you and an external person. And we're also moving away from the idea of roles as being something that says, don't hire me your neighbor. And, you know, it's hard to detect really exactly where the shift takes place and you know and it probably matters more for the historians and it does for our discussion.

But the reason this shift over time, where originally the duty of care was, you know, a limitation, or a restriction, or a line, you shouldn't cross and kind of grasping for words here, you know, a prohibition again against doing things, or allowing things to happen matter, harmful to mothers, right?

And we're moving away from that and it's not simply about protecting others. Now it's going to be more about the standard of care. Not, we begin to provide because that's kind of what happens once we started once we shifted from ethics to standards. What you have standards, you can have standards both ways, right?

You shouldn't do this, but you should do this. So, we're beginning that shift. And again, it's hard to say exactly where this happens in history or you're already even whether there's any distinct place that it happens. But it does happen. Dorothy Emmet who has a one paragraph description and Wikipedia.

Not because she's not important but probably because she's a woman as a well-known analysis of the casual and functional explanation of roles. And although she sees roles as mostly defining, you know, the sort of professional responsibility that you have. It's a mistake to abstract that responsibility from the role depersonalization of role relations.

She says is not only to misconstrue their nature and their importance in humans society but also to miss the subtlety and sophistication of their interpretation and realization in action. Anything kind of talk about this in both senses, you can talk about it in the sense of the prohibitions. You should not lie.

For example, is a prohibition, but if you just use that as an abstract principle and depersonalize, it just, you know, like concepts, right? It's something that everybody should follow all the time. Doesn't matter who you are or even whether you actually believe it, then you're not really sensitive to the sophisticated nature of a rule, like, don't lie because what we we know or a reasonable person means are, reasonable person.

Knows that it means don't lie, unless there's a foreseeable likelihood that somebody's going to be injured as a result, in which case lie, like the wind. I know the gestapo agent is knocking at your door and you have people hidden in your basement. You know, if you tell the Gestapo agent that there are people hidden in your basement, those people will die.

So yes, it is morally. Permissible to lie in that circumstance. There are films that explore. Also, the question of whether it is morally, required to lie, and that's the other side of it, right? What would we construe a duty of care to the people in the basement or to other people?

Generally, what would we construct that to be? And again, just abstracting it depersonalizing, it takes it out of the contacts and losers. The sophistication of the rule that we, as reasonable people understand it to actually have. So I think well Emily is getting at the professionalization of these roles.

She's also talking about the the distinction between what we can say air that the causal and functional explanations of the roles, The functional explanation of a role is the role as of exist as being part of a profession. All right? You're fulfilling that function, but the causal meaning of the role is the explanation of why you do the thing that you do, you see how they're distinct?

Right. And I think this is an important distinction to draw and I think that it impacts a lot more of her philosophy and other areas, you know? I mean she she she looks at for example suppose here undertaking a right, you know a religious right? Maybe a wedding profession.

Let's say I don't think she uses that once specifically but she does talk about rights, right? So why is the father of the bride escorting? The bride up. The aisle. Why is the bride being escorted? Well, I used the grooms standing there, right? But we could talk about all of this in terms of their roles within the context of participants in a wedding right?

The father of the bride, he's in the role of father of the bride. Didn't really have much choice in the matter but there he is. Right Bride and groom there in the role of bride and groom priest is in a professional role as you know the adjudicator of the wedding.

But that's not. Why any of them are there doing those things, right? The reason why they're all there is they all stand in personal relationships to each other and have made decisions based on their belief in the importance of what they're doing and their desire to see it through.

In this case the the importance of getting married in the desire to actually engage in that and see the wedding through to its completion. See the distinction and the same distinction can be made between ethical principles thought of his codes of ethics, applying to a profession, and ethical principles, applying to codes of ethics as performed by professionals is the distinction between a profession and an individual professional.

Herbert Cole draws on this thinking of the role of a teacher, for example, the way anyone might perform it, which is really for the most part kind of an impersonal way of thinking of a teacher, right? And it's interesting how much not just of the ethics of learning and analytics and AI.

But how much hard discussions about teaching, generally are coached in terms of the role of the teacher? The way anyone might perform it. In fact, all of learning design is set up way, right? In fact, it's deliberately set up that way so that, any old teacher can come along and take a learning designer and apply it.

Any old teacher can come along and take an open educational resource and apply it. That's one way of thinking of the role of a teacher. But on the other hand, we can think of being a teacher from the perspective of how a specific person does it. And here again, we draw this distinct distinction between the, the functional explanation of what a person does as a teacher and how a person is, as a teacher and the causal explanation and bracket, I'm using the terms functional and causal on the right hand a bit.

Technically, because they have very specific meanings and philosophy. But on the other hand a bit loosely and these are not the only ways we could explain these two roles functional and causal stand in for the purpose of this discussion as useful proxies, and not as definitive as the only way we can think of this thing end of a side.

Sorry, it's hope probably wasn't helpful, but that was for the floss first. So we have the functional account of what it is to be teacher, and the causal account of what it is to be a teacher. Or we could say, now what it is to be, what it is to teach, versus what it is, to be a teacher, you see them distinction.

And for cone, we got to arrive at this new distinction or call. We can arrive at the distinction. This way it's being a teacher is not simply a job. It's also, well, it is of vocation something very different and I think you'll find fat and just about any discipline I have for many years, talked about, you know, how being a physicist or being a chemist isn't just doing the job of being a physicist or a chemist.

It isn't even knowing all of the facts that a physicist knows. Milling. All the facts about a chemist knows, but it's a whole range of other things. It's using the same words, the same way, it's taking the same sort of things as counting for evidence. It's having a commonly commonly defined set of problems or types of problems.

It's seeing the world in the same sort of way, it's adhering to the same standards. But now when it's a vocation, it becomes even more than that, it becomes almost like part of your identity, you know? It's like me I'm a researcher and in that I go do my work with NRC but you know, you'll find me at six pm, Sunday, evening, still doing these videos, right?

And that's how I'm taking it a bit beyond being a researcher. And and, you know, now this is a part of who I am. This is not just what I do. This is who I am. These are not simply principles that guide me. These are principles that I've instantiated in myself.

See the difference? I know it's loose the trough so and where that comes from we could say and I think called does say where that comes from is grounded in the relationship between teacher and students. And I'd go a bit beyond that because I would say, it's grounded in the relationship between teacher and subject matter, or, perhaps teacher and society, as a whole.

So, you know, it's not just this one to one teacher student relationship. You know, we've we've gone beyond beyond more serious transactional distance, right. We've gone toward the idea of a presence in teaching a cognitive presence, a social presence of teaching, presence, all of the stuff from Anderson Archer and Garrison, all of wrapped up in the concept of being a teacher as of vocation or being a teacher researcher as a vocation, there are different kinds of teachers.

Being a vocational teacher as a location. Sorry, couldn't resist that. So, but still it's the relationship in coal between teacher and student it dwells on the mutuality between the two as they teach each other. And the for thinking of Palo Frieri here, we've probably should be. We can certainly see the relationship between the discipline of hope.

And the pedagogy of hope that fiery writes,

Maximum swimmer. Recently did a study of teacher and ethical codes, and this is something that I missed when I was doing the module and ethical codes. And certainly if I ever did this course again, which I'd like to do, then this work will go back into that module, but I still want to draw this.

So, even here because it's relevant here. So we have these codes of ethics, these standards of ethical practice to find within the scope of the profession. They argue that these codes of ethics, provide and incomplete discrete. Depiction of teacher day, ontology. An incomplete depiction of the rules. That govern?

What a teacher should do. And and they argue that this comes from the corporatists side, the management and administration of educational institutions. And they say the extent of corporatist content in these codes is negative and confusing. And again, there's a lot of discussion that we can have about that, which I won't cover here.

But but it's certainly relevant the, the main conclusion that they draw is for teacher education, codes of athletics, have important limitations, and I think the way we could freeze that is, they'll talk about the function of being a teacher in a functionary, sort of way, but they don't talk about the practice of being a teacher the way it actually works.

So for real teachers, in real circumstances or to put it another way regulatory codes can draw attention away from other possibly richer ways of conceptualizing how professionals can and should negotiate the ethical demands and compatibility of professional life. You know, and we have a duty of care. Even in a profession, this duty of care is not exhausted.

By the professional code, the professional code describes the function, but the professional code does not describe what it is to be a member of that profession. Specifically, with respect to the interpersonal relationships, they will have with their clients and with society at large,

We could look at this from the perspective of schools as a changing way of looking at schools and looking at education, generally over time and just as an aside ask yourself where current discussions of ethics in analytics and AI or situated, Michael Fielding are used for what he calls a person center to approach in which the purposes of educational organizations are accomplished not by abandoning their distinctly, distinctively educational aspirations.

But rather by transforming their organizational forms and capacities into the vibrancy and creativity of inclusive education communities. We have the chart here. So we begin with schools as impersonal organizations by analogy. We have ethical codes which define the duty of care has impersonal obligations. And as we look more, you know, as these institutions of all, we have what we could say are schools as affective communities where we begin to focus more on the positive, we begin to focus more on the personal seeing the impersonal organizations, the functional marginalized, the personal.

Or as we were saying the causal in the case of affective communities, the personal or the causal, marginalizes the functional. Similarly, now we could move towards an idea of schools as high performance learning organizations. But now the positive is subservient to the negative. It's more about avoiding error of voiding, gaps.

Manages about doing things. Accomplishing things being something as compared to a person-centered learning community where the negative is subservient to the positive were more about doing the right thing, as opposed to avoiding doing the wrong thing, That changes how we talk to each other, and with each other, you know, we're and it changes how we look at development, you know, the high performance organization talks about organizational, capital or human capital for that matter.

Whereas the person, centered learning community talks about holistic development, etc. Now you don't have to buy into the whole grid, I'm not asking you to do that. In fact you you pick your place on the grid if that's the way you like to do things. But I, what I do want you to see is this transformation that has happened and it has happened.

Then it's a matter of empirical observation that we started with the one and then we've developed these other forms from this idea of duty of care as day. Ontological morality based in a social contract, completely, and personal just business, you know, to something like a duty of care as being person centered relationship, centered focused on achieving the good rather than preventing the bad.

Now I know I'm being a little bit hand-wavy with all of this but I've got less than an hour to do again another full course, but I want to see how this concept of the duty of care, even thought of as a legal concept has shifted through time. And our understanding of what we mean, by care has gone from impersonal to more personal preventing harm to doing good etc.

Now, I wanted to throw a slide in here near the end to talk about the birding of care because a duty is a burden, and it's interesting. This is something that Hornet Campbell is drawn out. I'm talking about how this new found version of care is falling on traditionally marginalized workers and it's an interesting observation because we could think of it, almost as though we are saying we're depression or deep professionalizing.

It making it, personal more personal, not less personal, where moving it out of the domain of things that men do and into the domain of things that women do. And we're also adding to it, right? Because, you know, avoiding a harm is still there. But now we have all of this other care work that needs to be done and mostly as learn.

A camel says, it's falling in the hands on the hands of women and not just on the hands of woman but very often in the hands of women, who are at the bottom of the hierarchy who have little to no power to manage how this work is managed. So this should be thought of as well.

There is an element here of not just shifting responsibilities and shifting definitions, but also shifting power. And the more we think of care as something that is personal, and is based on relationships, the less we think of it as something that men should do. And the more we think of it as something that women should do.

And when I say we, I mean, not really loosely, right? Because I certainly don't consider myself as holding that view. But observationally, you know, looking in looking at society. The risk. This distinction between what might typically be characterized as women's work and care falls under the heading of women's work.

And we want to be careful here, not to simply use something like the duty of care as a way of passing off the responsibility on to women and saying okay they've got that we can move on with something important, that's not the way this works, right? Okay. Just to wrap up.

Then I've constructed a bit of a narrative out of this, it may or may not be historically accurate but it works. Certainly for petted, logical purposes. I think. And I think there is a sense that it probably is historically true as well. Although historians fight it out. I started this presentation with the caution.

I am not a lawyer, I'll end it with the caution. I am not a historian but the duty of care is a legal concept starts out as a principal of being good neighbors and being a good neighbor in law. Anyways becomes the responsibility not to hurt your neighbor. And over time, this responsibility becomes more and more codified and especially in the case where there are special relationships because you know, neighbors already abound concept.

It doesn't mean everybody. It means a certain group of people which means we can narrow the constraint to special relationships, especially relationships where there's an expectation of trust that you will carry out your responsibilities diligently, and completely. And when we think of them in this context of a profession, they shift from being and ethic to being a standard or a specification, a description of how you do a profession.

But over time for care, especially, and, but I would argue for other standards and specifications as well. We see it shifting as we see people in shifting roles and shifting responsibilities, and especially when we see people in habit, multiple roles and multiple sets of responsibilities. And we find that these legal principles express to standards or rules or principles have important limitations, they describe what we're doing, functionally, but they're not describing what we're doing as people.

And so we get this distinction between impersonal organizations and personal communities. And this is characteristic of a chef that is taken place in education over the years as well, for education was something very impersonal, very managerial, something where teachers dictate students and did were you applied standards to something where the relation between teacher and student becomes much more important.

And so, the concept of the duty of care shifts from the idea of preventing harm to also promoting good but we need to end on a note of caution. This additional duty of promoting. Good has thus far fallen disproportionately on women and more marginalized people working in the academic community and indeed in the professional community as a whole.

So that's duty of care is a legal concept with that. We're going to abandon who to give care is a legal concept. It's interesting in that it sets some context for us, but as a legal concept, I think we can conclude from this discussion. Anyways, it doesn't serve as an ethical concept.

I mean data scenic might say and I am a cynic that it has allowed us over the years to avoid thinking in terms of ethical concepts especially when we're talking about the professions to abstract the ethics out and especially the the aspect of personal morality of through abstracted out of these professions, they into avoid talking about ethics at all, In a legal context in a business context, sometimes in a medical context and sometimes in a teaching context And I think that's been for the worse.

I think that thinking of a duty of care simply as a depersonalized functional, definition of what counts as being responsible in these professions is obviously inadequate and thinking of it that way, from the perspective of new technologies with new affordances like artificial intelligence and analytics. If you're, if you're thinking of it only as a legal concept, then as we said, you're thinking will have some important limitations, especially, as they abstract away from the very real and very important relations that teachers have with students that students have with each other and that all of us have with each other within society.

So, when we move on, we'll talk about the duty of care as a pedagogical concept first, and as an ethical principle generally as discussed in the works of people like Carol Gillian, net, nodding and others. But that's for next module, or not next module, next video. And that reps up for this video.

So I'm Stephen Downs. This has been another episode of ethics analytics and the duty of care and I'll see you next time.

It's an hour long do that.

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