Objections to Care Theory

By Stephen Downes
Nov 29, 2021
Transcript of Objections to Care Theory

Unedited Transcript from Audio by Google Recorder

Hi everyone. It's Steven Downs here, again with ethics analytics and the duty of care Today. We're going to look at some objections to care theory, as we wind down. I look at the ethics of care in module six. We're just sort of making that transition from six to seven, but I want to cover this as part of the loose ends that need to be looked before we move on specifically to the decisions that we make in analytics and AI.

So I don't want to linger along time on this or we're going to scoop through a bunch of these objections relatively briskly. Although you can look at them in more detail. I wanted to think that they actually show us is the range in the breadth of discussion that has taken place in the last 30 years or so.

On care theory. There's been, you know, this burst of creativity in the literature as this new approach has unfolded. And I think it comes out hand in hand with a lot of other moves in philosophy. And in ethics, generally, I'm not just there, but also in our understanding of cognition and social development.

So I think all of this comes together and it's all part and parcel of the same, kind of movement that's happening in philosophy. Happening in society, the objections here are drawn from the wider literature. And especially I've drawn a number almost point for point, from the internet and cyclopedia of philosophy.

I'm not really happy with how they've actually sketched out these objections, but I'll point to some of my criticisms of the way they're phrased as well, as what I think the responses are and also to this a the the approach of offering a objections to care theory actually. As I say here positions, the theory of care.

As a traditional philosophical theory, that demands argumentation and defense, I don't think that really reflects the the basis from which ethics of care theory is drawn. It's not being presented as if the very alongside shall we say utilitarianism or contract theory or virtue ethics as another one of these choices that you would argue about?

I think the perspective it offers is different and so just treating it as one more candidate that we are going. Are you about is misdirected? And I would make the same comments about, for example, a connectivist approach to learning which is often positioned as one more theory that you can choose after say, instructivism or constructivism or whatever.

Behaviorism. Oh yeah. So just pick, you know, pick your theory and argue for it. No, let's not how it works. All right, so the first objection and is based on quote, and quote women's nature, and just for the record, I did a search on Google and image search for women's nature and actually put the link in here.

Because I got a whole pile of images of which the image I used here is characteristic. And so, the criticism is that an ethics of care, linked to quote, women's nature run, quote, is something that calls upon, and reinforces gender-based stereotypes. You know, it's a think of the reference to things like women's intoition or women is having softer more caring kinds of feelings rather than the rational objective heartage, thinking of men, etc.

And even if it's true, talking Williams, right, it may still be epistemic epistemically. That's a terrible word. It should be epistemologically, ethically, and prudently, imprudent, or sorry, and politically imprudent to associate women with the value of care. And this is the sort of argument, you know, that's based on how your opponents perceive you, you know, the socialist here, that's all the time.

You shouldn't argue for full-fledged socialism because the people who oppose socialism were will just find this as a caricature way of thinking about socialism. Well, that may be true but the definition of socialism isn't dependent on what opponents of socialism think in neither should the definition of an ethics of care.

Be defined by what opponents to an ethics of care. Might think another objection is based on under the heading of employment objections and calls us to think of two separate and distinct expression of feelings by people who are in caring or working occupations between a real feeling's. And, you know, authentic feeling same.

This comes up when the employee is required as part of the duties of the job, to force their own feelings into the background. It's kind of a version of the, the customers, always, right? I think there's a point to this, in the sense that, you know, it really is not reasonable to ask that the two sets of feelings converge.

So that your real feelings are the same as your quote-unquote in authentic feelings. Nonetheless, is probably true that the best care workers or the best service workers are those who who genuinely feel upon this and an affinity for their customers. Even those are constances might make it the case that they don't, but I don't see any of this as an objection to an ethics of care.

Particularly, you know, because I don't think there are real and inauthentic feelings. If you have a fewing you have a feeling. If you are motivated to provide care, your motivated to provide care a job responsibility, may impose behaviors on you like face smiles, but it can impose feelings on you.

So I don't think that we can draw this distinction that disagion is based on in the internet and encyclopedia philosophy. It leads off the section of criticisms of care, ethics with career ethics as a slave morality. Now this is a concept that was developed originally by Nietzsche. And if you look on line for you, find quite a bit of references to meetings and some really telling quotes, which I thought about putting in here about I figured I'd leave that as an exercise for you but the idea is that a people would ever people that is oppressed tends to develop a morality that reaffirms observient traits as values.

So, you know, like, you know, getting along, not disturbing authority, not rocking the boat, all of, which could be examples of slave morally. And what happens is that the generalization is extended to the effect that any I won't say virtue, but, but any practice, or any property of the slave owner or the oppressor is interpreted as something negative.

So if you're a presser thinking a logical rational way then, because there, your repressor thinking in a logical, rational way must be wrong. And so we got care ethics career ethics, then on these grounds, are criticized as the type of slave morality valorizing, the oppression of women, taking the oppression of women as a given.

And then looking at, okay, what ways of working, what ways of thinking do, women actually have given that they're oppressed. And then advancing those to a higher moral status, except I don't think it does that. I it certainly raises the opinions and the perceptions and the expressions of feeling and the expressed needs of people who are oppressed and for very good reason.

But it doesn't through that process, assume that a certain set of ethics that characterize, the oppressed people's ethics is then a kind of ethics that applied to everyone, simply because it doesn't take any set of ethics as a set of ethics that applies to everyone. You know, the the ethics of the situation is in the situation and so there's no such thing as a slave ethic that is applied on a wider.

Scale here, Carol Gilligan in particular, has been criticized for basing her conclusions on faulty studies and especially on studies of students who study at elite universities and especially from, you know, a Western US based perspective. I think that's fair in that. Those are criticisms of the studies. It doesn't follow the those are criticisms of the theory.

Yeah, she could be right, even though her empirical data was flawed and I think the proliferation of work that's followed since Carol Gelligan, or maybe more accurately before after during and around Carica, again, is evidence of that. So sure we can allow that. Those particular studies are fought or in a very least far too narrow like, by the way, most of the rascal cognitive psychology but that doesn't mean that the theory is false, it doesn't offer an argument against theory.

This is one, I've seen a lot, as I mentioned on the outside for connectivism the not a theory objection. And the way this is typically phrased is that your theory in this case care ethics, is already covered by this that are some other aspects of some previous theory. So, like, your theory talks about autonomy, equality and justice.

Well, autonomy, equality and justice. We're already covered by current so your theory isn't really a new theory but or here, you know, John Paley, writing, contright writings provide the care ethicists with everything they're required except that con's ethics. Ethics is based on a universality principle as we saw and an ethics of care very much isn't.

And so the way these principles such as autonomy, equality and justice instantiate is going to be different in can't equality. For example, is going to be half, is going to have to be something that can be applied in the same way to every person throughout society in the past and the future, whatever.

But in an ethics of care, equality is something that is applied differently in each individual circumstance, in which it comes up, it's defined differently. It's applied differently, the effects are evaluated differently. So, it's not enough simply to say, well, have the same words and comments. All is the same theory.

I think that the ethics of care is very distinct from quantity and ethics, and for that matter from social contract, or utilitarian ethics as well. It's also not a theory in the sense that, you know, theories properly. So called our supposed to provide broad sweeping generalization that explain why swaths of natural phenomena.

And that's not how career ethics works. I mean, we could, if we really wanted to describe care ethics and a few succinct sentences and we've done that already, that could be adapted for every situation but these sentences. So construed are kind of hollow and empty, because we actually really do need to know the scenario, but that's also true of these other theories and why there's a problem with them, you know, complex phenomena, like, ethics or human society, or the weather aren't easily and flawlessly described by natural law.

The way. Simple things are like rockets like computer science, like algebra. And so, you know, we shouldn't make the mistake of completing between the two career. Ethics is also described as parochial, which is to say it applies to one specific group and not to a wider group. Now how this happens or how this is instantiated is different, depending on which theorists you're talking about.

But for example, now nodding says that caregivers have their primary obligations to proximate, others, that is to say people who are in the immediate environment over distance others. So your obligation to provide care is most strong regarding the person in the room, you're with and least strong. Regarding a person who's on the other side of the planet which is a matter of practical reality.

You can do a lot more for the person who's right there in front of you. But critics worry, and I'm quoting here that this stance privileges, elite caregivers by excusing them from attending to significant differences, in international, standards of living and their causes and would be true if all of care ethics happens in that specific room where there's a caregiver and there's a care receiver, but that's not what care.

Ethics covers, it does take a broader view, we did look at how care ethics can be applied on a community and on a global basis and the impact on community. And more importantly, the impact of community on the caregiver importance. And so as a result, it simply not true that caregivers providing care to you know, elite clients are just you know are freed from or given a pass on their wider obligations simply because of the proximity principle.

I think that would have been clear in the outline that I provided, but I wanted to mention that here as well career ethics as essentialists. So, the criticism here is that career ethics appeals to a quote, essential nature of women. And you get that anytime you say something like, oh, women are such and such.

For example, if you said, oh, women are natural caregivers, then you're speaking about something that is always present and unchangingly present in all women. Now, I don't think care ethics does that. I do think that those sorts of remarks are made, but I don't see those as defining, the extensions scope of care.

Ethics. Now, quite fairly someone might criticize me of, you know, minimizing me impact of feminism and the nature of women in my account of care ethics. And, you know, I possibly stand guilty of that. I'm not sure. I don't think so. I've tried not to, I tried to very much reflect, the roots in feminism, for career ethics.

And, and to be clear about the fact that there are some aspects of care ethics that I can't speak to from experience partially because I'm not a woman and partially because I have it mean working in a lot of these care environments. And I think if I had an extended stay in a hospital even my understanding and perhaps attitude toward care, might change, who knows.

But I do what I can with the experience that I have. But I think that the rears a good understanding of the fact that women differ from each other, in many ways, certainly, we've discussed the ways that the context and circumstances in which women find themselves will differ from one person to the next because we said explicitly, my capacity to care, depends, in part on how society interacts with me, or how society cares for me.

I would argue that, you know, well, there may be an essential nature of women that, you know, it's at a DNA level or something like that. The difference is between individual. Women are sweeping and profound the differences, not just physically, but in their experience, they're upbringing their background, their education, etc.

And I don't think anyone can care ethics. Would I not if they did, then they would be subject to the subjection and quite rightly, but I don't think they actually do. Carer ethics is also argued to be ambiguous and this is a kind of like, you know this is almost circular let me quote this because it is shoes.

Abstract principles in decisional. Procedures carathics is often accused of being unduly ambiguous and for failing to offer concrete, guidance for ethical action. And my reaction to that is well yeah I could be precise but wrong but if my effort is to be in precise, but right arguing that I'm in precise as a criticism ignores.

A fact that I would be precise, but wrong. You see what? I mean, there are reasons why it issues abstract principles, and those reasons are not offset by the precision, or concrete guidance. It could provide from one circumstance to the next to the next to the next. And you know, it's it's funny held is it Elizabeth held?

I think here's is noted a spending, several chapters refuting claims that cares anti-universalist and cannot serve as an ethical theory here. I think she's accepting the objection and saying, no, no, no, we are really universalists and I think that would be a mistake. I would resist the claim that care is universalist and and go for making good decisions as opposed to making consistent or rule-based or fully guided or concrete decisions.

That would be my take. Anyways of here, we have an objection and, you know, there's a number of these objections are expressed in the form of feelings this or feeling that. And I want to get out in front of that by saying, I don't see ethics of care as being based around a concept or theory of feelings.

Particularly it's based on the concept of sentiment perhaps but that's distinct and and I'm actually going to talk about that more in the next video when I discuss, he is theory of sentiment, but it's not as they say mere feelings, right? It's, it's not intuitions hunters or any of these stereotypical descriptions.

I, if pressed would describe it as instances of recognition, you know, the terror is able to recognize the need on the part of the part of the care, receiver, or to recognize the injustice, especially when they speak to the caregiver and express what they're need is, you know? So it's not simply that.

Oh, yeah, I care ethics is all about compassion and empathy and all of that. No, that's not the case. Now, the more serious thing here is that the concepts, whatever they may be, can be used as justification for great violence. That's a concern. I haven't seen any example of great violence being caused because someone cared to much.

But, you know, if, if you're natural, inclination to think of caring, as something as emotional non-rational unrestrained and you cannot imagine somebody flying into a range and are and causing great violence, but that wouldn't be consistent with what my understanding of an ethics of care is because if the person is inclined to commit violence, then whoever their committee violence again, automatically becomes a care receiver.

Not a very good career, you know, it's not the kind of relationship you want with them but, you know, they're relation with that person. Now has to be considered and their impact on that person has to be considered. It's not simply that you are outraged by the fact that someone was that and therefore go into this.

Murderous rage, the very fact of going into a murderous rage is going to have a wider impact across society and then ethics of care what argue that. You think about that first? Before you do any such thing and we'll find that murderous rages are not justified or not sanctioned by, I think any interpretation of a career ethics that I can think of finally, my own criticism of the ethics of care and evoluted to this before is that it's a view from above, that is to say that the ethics of cares, describe, predominantly from the position of the caregiver.

I haven't seen this objection in the literature, although it would not surprise me at all if it is there, you know? I mean, why would I think that I'm, you know, after 30 years, I've come up with a completely unique theory or completely unique objection to the ethics of care.

That would be ridiculous. But I think we can say something like, you know, the needs expressed or otherwise of the cared for much, be, might be much more pragmatic than the needs as perceived by and describe by the ethics of care. And we see that a lot in actual concrete social situations, where the people who are trying to provide social reform in social change and justice.

Inequity. And all of that come to a population and oppressed population, arguably in need of these things. And the oppressed population says something like, whoa, I don't need any of that. I need food on the table. I need job security, and better health care and you see the dissonance between the caregiver and the care receiver and the ethics of care as I've been reading.

It always seems to be from the perspective of the caregiver. No that might be me misinterpreting it. And if so put me down and as just this aim is all the rest of those objections and I'm perfectly fine to be found to have been saying that the other thing here is it doesn't seem reasonable to require the cared for

Well, I've written here, stimulate urgency or motivation in the caregiver. I mean, yes, it's important for there to be a relationship in order for the caregiver to actually understand or assess what the care receivers need is. But you can't put a whole lot of owners on the care. Receiver to be able to articulate that and you have to be careful about that.

It's more. Like, if they say something you really need to listen to it, but don't expect that they're going to be able to or going to be in a position to express all of the needs that they actually have. Now, we need to be careful here. Because now, if I start imposing my view of what their needs are even though they haven't expressed them, that can be very patronizing.

It again, coming from this view from above. So we want to be careful about that, but at the same time, we have to take into account the actual real position of the people who are receiving care and what their perception of the issues are, what their perception of the potential redress is and begin from that perspective.

Before we start try to put anything on them and and especially before we start putting in onus on them, I'll give you a really concrete example of this from my own life and that's the case of indigenous land claims and Canada. Now, one, one of, if not the most urgent requirements of reconciliation in Canada for our treatment of indigenous people's and and the process of culination colonization can be expressed with the principle land back.

You know, it was their land, give it back. You know, in in the in the words of midnight oil, right? How can we sleep when our beds are burning? It belongs to them let's give it back. So I'm not sure what that means. I don't think they want my house.

I mean I'm pretty sure they don't if they do then we probably have a problem but I don't think they do but I'm not clear on what they mean by land back. Now you know first nations indigenous people's own, the land kind of the way the government of Canada owns the land, right?

My house is part of Canada. I pay taxes based on laws and principles from the provincial and federal governments on subject to easements. I'm subject to expropriation etc, right. So it might be my land, but contrary to what, you know, some of the sovereign individualists think my ownership of this land is not independent of the country in, which is set.

Now, if land back, simply means transferring ownership of that, kind of ownership from Canada to indigenous nations, that makes a bit more sense to me. But now, I have a problem of having lived in a democracy. And now I live in something that is not a democracy and so, and I don't think that's what they're asking for either.

But maybe they're asking for all or some of crown lens. Maybe they're asking for all or some of the royalties from resources on the lines. It's that I could go on, right? And, and but let's not the point here is it's not up to the indigenous. People to explain this to me.

And, you know, the way I've just put it it really, you know, it's like I should just go to one of them. So what do you mean by land back? Right. But they're not in a position. They do that because there's 20 million of me and far fewer of them.

And yeah, and it takes a lot of explaining. So the obligation on me, the former well, the the sentence of former colonizers are more accurately. The descendants of former Irish refugees from English colonization, that's whole separate issue. The onus is on me to determine as best I can by talking with them when I can or listening to them, when they speak and then doing whatever I can in good faith to make good on that requirement of land back, but it's not all on them and it's not all on the cared for to create this urgency and motivation on a part of the carrier.

Now, I think care, ethics, probably respects that, but to the extent that it doesn't, that would be a criticism. Anyhow, that's it for this video. Next up will be a discussion of David Hume and the idea of morality or ethics as a sentiment. And I think there we can begin to make some real progress in bringing together some of the stuff that we've been talking about on ethics.

And some of the stuff that we've been talking about on analytics and AI in the field of learning bringing all those together. I'm Steven Downs, thanks a lot for listening to me, aren't you happy? It's a half hour video talk to you next time.

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